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INTRODUCTION
As most students attending colleges and universities (and their
parents) understand, the cost of higher education is quite high. In
*
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the past year, tuition and fees at four-year colleges increased by
approximately six percent with an inflation rate in the range of three
1
percent. Over the last three decades, the cost of attendance at
colleges and universities increased at rates well in excess of the
2
economy-wide rate of inflation. During this period, the real income
3
levels for most of the population have not increased significantly.
Moreover, in recent years, colleges and universities have allocated
more of their financial aid budgets towards “merit” scholarships with
a smaller percentage of grants awarded on the basis of financial
4
need. As a result, these costs make it difficult, if not impossible, for
lower-income students to attend four-year institutions, even when
5
they are academically qualified to do so.
Economists argue that higher education produces positive
externalities because it produces benefits to society at large,
6
including the creation of a more productive workforce.
Commentators assert that higher education provides low-income
7
children with the greatest opportunity for economic advancement.
For these reasons, the federal government has long provided
financial assistance to help students pay for the cost of attendance at

1. Robert Tomsho, As Tuition Soars, Federal Aid to College Students Falls, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 25, 2006, at B-1.
2. See COLLEGE BD., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 7 (2006), available at
http://www.collegeboard.com/trends [hereinafter TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING]
(finding a three percent increase in the average inflation-adjusted tuition and fees
for private four-year colleges and a four percent increase in tuition and fees for
public four-year colleges).
3. See JACQUELINE E. KING, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., 2003 STATUS REPORT ON THE
PELL GRANT PROGRAM 7 (2003) (noting that the average income for low-income
families decreased by six percent during the past three decades while the average
income for middle-income families increased by only eight percent).
4. See ELAINE M. MAAG & KATIE FITZPATRICK, URBAN INST., FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID
FOR HIGHER EDUCATION: PROGRAMS AND PROSPECTS 7, 39 (2004) (recognizing that the
amount of “institutional grants” offered to students in the highest income quartile
have increased by ten percent from the 1990s to 2000 while grants to students in the
lowest income quartile have only increased about two percent).
5. See Tomsho, supra note 1 (asserting that low-income students are opting to
attend two-year colleges as a way of making higher education more affordable).
6. See INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC. POLICY, REAPING THE BENEFITS: DEFINING THE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE VALUE OF GOING TO COLLEGE 14 (1998), available at
http://www.ihep.org/Pubs/PDF/Reap.pdf (listing other public economic benefits as
increased tax revenue, increased consumption, increased workforce flexibility, and
decreased reliance on government financial support).
7. See id. at 8 (noting that Bill Clinton stated that in 1996, the average worker
with a college degree made seventy-three percent more in annual earnings than a
worker without a college degree); see also Lindsey Vada, The Widening Gap Under the
Internal Revenue Code: The Need for Renewed Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 17-18
(2001) (contending that one way to fight poverty is to promote higher education to
the lower class).
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8

institutions of higher education.
At the outset, this assistance
focused on students whose family circumstances were quite modest.
9
In 1972, Congress enacted the Pell Grant program to help lowerincome families pay for university education. Subsequently, Congress
10
enacted the federal student loan program.
Today, this program
11
12
provides both subsidized loans and unsubsidized loans. Each year,
13
the annual volume of new student loans exceeds $50 billion.
Over the past fifteen years, Congress turned to tax expenditure
14
programs to help taxpayers pay for the cost of higher education.
Prior to these enactments, the federal income tax only minimally
addressed the tax benefits that could arise from paying the cost of
higher education. The principal tax issues that arose from paying
higher educational expenses were whether educational expenses
15
could be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense
and whether interest paid with respect to student loans was
16
deductible.
8. See Chessconsulting.org, History of Financial Aid, http://www.chess
consulting.org/financialaid/history.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (noting the 1958
National Defense Education Act (“NDEA”), later renamed as the Federal Perkins
Loan Program, as one of the first measures that provided a student loan program
offering long-term, low-interest loans to students in the fields of mathematics,
science and foreign languages).
9. Pell Grants were originally called Basic Educational Opportunity Grants.
Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 410, 86 Stat. 235, 247-48. The
original grant program was renamed the Federal Pell Grant Program in 1980.
Higher Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, § 402, 94 Stat. 1367,
1401.
10. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 411, 106
Stat. 448, 510 (creating the Federal Stafford Loan Program and PLUS Loans).
11. The federal government pays the interest costs during the period in which
the student is in college or graduate school.
12. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, §§ 427-28,
106 Stat. 448, 549.
13. AM. COUNCIL FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN DEBT: 1993 TO
2004 1 (2005).
14. BARRY D. BURGDORF & KENT KOSTKA, ELIMINATING COMPLEXITY IN FEDERAL
FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION STUDENTS: TOWARDS A MORE
STRATEGIC APPROACH 2 (2006), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/
hiedfuture/reports/burgdorf-kostka.pdf.
15. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2000); see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (2005) (allowing a deduction
for education expenses if the education maintains or improves skills either required
by the individual in his trade or business or required by an individual’s employer).
16. Although I.R.C. § 163(a) authorizes a deduction for interest paid on
indebtedness during the taxable year, I.R.C. § 163(h) disallows any deduction for
personal interest. Except to the extent that I.R.C. § 221 allows a deduction, interest
paid on student loans is treated as non-deductible personal interest. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511, 100 Stat. 2085, 2244-48, eliminated
the deduction for personal interest. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 then restored
partial deductibility of student loan interest. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-34, § 202, 111 Stat. 788, 806-09. I.R.C. § 127 also provides a tax exclusion for
a limited amount of tuition that an employer pays for an employee’s educational
assistance. 26 U.S.C. § 127 (2000).
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Congress has added numerous statutory provisions designed to
17
In 1997,
help taxpayers pay for the cost of higher education.
Congress enacted the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits, which
provide a tax credit of up to $2,000 per year for taxpayers who pay for
18
attendance at a school of higher education. These tax credits are
available for taxpayers whose “modified adjusted gross income” does
19
not exceed specified statutory limits.
Specifically, an unmarried
taxpayer is eligible for one of these tax credits only if the taxpayer’s
modified adjusted gross income is less than $55,000, and married
taxpayers are eligible for a tax credit only if their modified adjusted
20
gross income is less than $110,000.
Congress enacted § 222 in 2001 to provide a degree of assistance
21
for higher income families. Under this provision, taxpayers may
22
claim an above-the-line deduction for a limited portion of their
23
higher education expenses. Unmarried taxpayers with incomes of
up to $65,000 (and married taxpayers with incomes of up to
$130,000) may deduct up to $4,000 of “qualified tuition and related
24
expenses.” For taxpayers whose incomes exceed these limits but do

17. This Article discusses only the education tax credits authorized in I.R.C.
§ 25A, the deduction for educational expenses in I.R.C. § 222 and the tax benefits
arising in connection with qualified tuition plans established pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 529. Overall, the Internal Revenue Code contains numerous other provisions that
may affect the tax treatment of students attending higher education. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 970: TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION (2006) [hereinafter
I.R.S. PUB. 970]. The provisions discussed herein are those that provide the most
widely available benefits for taxpayer-paid higher education expenses.
18. 26 U.S.C. § 25A (2000); see infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text
(discussing in general terms the mechanical operation of this provision). See generally
Glenn E. Coven, Bad Drafting—A Case Study of the Design and Implementation of the
Income Tax Subsidies for Education, 54 TAX LAW. 1 (2000) (providing a more
comprehensive discussion of technical issues that arise in connection with these
credits). The maximum amount of the Hope Scholarship Credit is adjusted, for
years after 2001, to reflect inflation. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(h)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). The
maximum level of the Lifetime Learning credit is not subject to inflation
adjustments. Id.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(d)(1)-(2) (2000 & West Supp. 2006).
20. Id. These dollar limits are indexed for inflation. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(h)(2)
(2000). Revenue Procedure 2005-70 contains the inflation adjusted dollar limits
applicable in 2006. Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979.
21. 26 U.S.C. § 222 (Supp. IV 2004).
22. See 26 U.S.C. § 62(a)(18) (Supp. IV 2004) (allowing a § 222 deduction from
gross income in order to reach adjusted gross income rather than as a deduction
from adjusted gross income in computing an individual’s taxable income).
23. See 26 U.S.C. § 222 (Supp. IV 2004), amended by Tax Relief and Health Care
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922, 2933 (postponing the
termination date of this provision to December 31, 2007).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 222(a), (b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2004).
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not exceed $80,000 for unmarried taxpayers (or $160,000 for married
25
taxpayers), the deduction is limited to $2,000.
In addition, Congress enacted § 529, which allows taxpayers to
exclude from income investment returns that are used to pay certain
26
higher educational expenses. This provision provides a significant
tax benefit for taxpayers who are able to save for the higher
education of their children or grandchildren. Unlike the tuition tax
credits and the § 222 deduction, there are no explicit dollar limits
imposed on the magnitude of the tax benefits that taxpayers may
27
realize from this provision. And unlike those provisions, § 529 does
not contain income limits that prevent high income taxpayers from
28
contributing to § 529 plans.
During this period of growth of tax-based federal grants for higher
education, Congress constrained funding for the traditional
expenditure programs. Specifically, the Pell Grants awarded to
25. Id. § 222(a), (b)(2)(B)(ii). Section 25A and § 222 utilize slightly different
income measures to determine eligibility for the benefits under these provisions.
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 25A(d)(3) (2000) (defining “modified adjusted gross income” as
the adjusted gross income for a taxable year increased by any amount excluded by
§§ 911, 913, or 933), with 26 U.S.C. § 222(b)(2)(C)(i)-(ii) (Supp. IV 2004) (defining
“adjusted gross income” “(i) without regard to this section and sections 199, 911, 931
and 933 and (ii) after application of sections 86, 135, 137, 219, 221, and 469”).
26. 26 U.S.C. § 529(c) (2000). Congress enacted I.R.C. § 529 in 1996. Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1806, 110 Stat. 1755,
1895-99. As enacted in 1996, § 529 created two significant tax benefits if taxpayers
use plan assets to pay higher education expenses. First, it deferred the taxation of
the investment income until amounts were distributed from the plan. Second, it
taxed the plan beneficiary (i.e., the lower tax-bracket student) rather than the
account owner (typically the student’s higher tax-bracket parent or grandparent). In
2001, Congress significantly enhanced the tax benefits arising in connection with 529
plans. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10716, § 402, 115 Stat. 38, 60-63. The 2001 Act provisions were scheduled to sunset for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010. Id. § 901(a)(1), 115 Stat. 38, 150.
Congress eliminated these sunset provisions in the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1304(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1109. Congress also enacted I.R.C.
§ 530, which created the so-called Coverdell Education Savings Account. This
provision differs from § 529 in several significant respects. First, contributions to a
Coverdell Education Savings Account are limited to $2,000 per year. 26 U.S.C.
§ 530(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 2004). Second, taxpayers with incomes in excess of
prescribed statutory limits may not make contributions to a Coverdell Education
Savings Account. Id. § 530(c)(1). Third, distributions from a Coverdell Education
Savings Account are excluded from income if used for either higher education
expenses or certain elementary or secondary education expenses. 26 U.S.C.
§ 530(b)(2) (2000). Apart from the tax preferred treatment of expenditures for the
elementary or secondary education expenses, § 530 provides no tax advantages as
compared to the tax savings available in § 529 plans. For this reason, this Article will
not discuss the Coverdell Education Savings Account provisions.
27. 26 U.S.C. § 529(b)(6) (2000) (prohibiting contributions in excess of those
necessary to cover the higher education expenses of the beneficiary, but placing no
actual dollar limit on the amount the taxpayer may contribute to an account).
28. See 26 U.S.C. § 529(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (listing requirements that
must be met to establish a qualified tuition program).
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undergraduate students failed to keep pace with the cost of higher
29
education. In the late 1970s, the maximum Pell Grant covered 99%
of the cost of attendance, including tuition, fees, room and board, at
public two-year colleges, 77% of the cost of attendance at public fouryear colleges, and 36% of the cost of attendance at private colleges
30
and universities. In 2003, the maximum Pell Grant covered 68% of
the costs at two-year institutions, 41% at four-year public institutions,
31
and 16% at four-year private institutions. This decline continued in
recent years, with the maximum Pell Grant covering only 33% of the
cost of tuition, fees, room and board at four-year colleges in 200532
06.
The decline in the purchasing power of the Pell Grant resulted
from two different factors. First, the cost of attendance at colleges
33
and universities grew faster than the general inflation rate. Incomes
for many families have not kept pace with these escalating costs.
Second, the maximum Pell Grant failed to grow in line with the
general rate of inflation, most significantly in the period from 1978 to
34
1996. Although significant increases in the maximum Pell Grant
were enacted in the late 1990s, the maximum Pell Grant increased
35
from $4,000 in academic year 2002-03 to only $4,050 today.
Moreover, in recent years many universities have shifted their
financial aid resources toward merit-based scholarships and away

29. BURGDORF & KOSTKA, supra note 14, at 2 (citing AMANDA SHARKEY, CENTER FOR
AM. PROGRESS, PAYING FOR POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: AN ISSUE BRIEF ON COLLEGE
COSTS AND FINANCIAL AID 9 (2005)).
30. KING, supra note 3, at 4.
31. Id.
32. See TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING, supra note 2, at 5 (finding the average total
cost of attendance at a four-year public college in 2005-06 to be $12,115 and the
average total cost of attendance at a four-year private college to be $28,743);
SHARKEY, supra note 29, at 11 (recognizing that the current amount of Pell Grant
funds available to undergraduate students is between $400 and $4,050).
33. TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING, supra note 2, at 4.
34. From 1978 to 1996, the inflation-adjusted value of the maximum Pell Grant
declined from $4,201 to $2,796. KING, supra note 3, at 28.
35. COLLEGE BD., TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2004: PELL GRANT STATUS REPORT 1
(2004), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost04/
pell2004.pdf. Both Congress and the President have recognized that the level of the
maximum Pell Grant is too low. In January, the House of Representatives passed
legislation that would increase the maximum Pell Grant to $4,310 for the 2007-08
academic year. H.R.J. Res. 20, 110th Cong. (2007). In its budget proposals for fiscal
year 2008, the Bush administration has proposed to increase the maximum Pell
Grant to $4,600, with additional $200 increases in the next four years. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2008 51 (2007). The administration proposed to
eliminate the Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant program and the
Perkins Loan program. Id.
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36

from students with greater financial need.
Combined with the
decline in purchasing power of the Pell Grants and the expansion of
subsidies provided under the Internal Revenue Code, the distribution
of resources available to low- and moderate-income students has
changed substantially. This Article will examine whether the tax
provisions constitute a sensible component of the federal financial
37
aid expenditure programs.
Part I of this Article discusses the principal tax provisions that
provide subsidies for higher education and analyzes the allocation of
benefits that arise from these provisions. Part II evaluates these
provisions from a tax policy perspective. Part III contains conclusions
and policy recommendations.
I. ANALYSIS OF TAX PROVISIONS
A. Higher Education Tax Credits
1.

General considerations
Section 25A includes two higher education tax credits, the Hope
38
Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit. A tax credit
directly reduces the amount of tax that a taxpayer owes. To the
extent that the taxpayer has tax liability prior to applying the tax
credit under this provision, the benefit that a taxpayer enjoys does
39
not depend upon the taxpayer’s tax bracket.
In contrast, a
deduction offsets the amount of income that is subject to tax.
Consequently, the tax benefit that a tax deduction generates depends
on the taxpayer’s tax bracket because the deduction offsets income
40
that would have been taxed at that rate of tax.
36. See, e.g., Lynn O’Shaughnessy, Not Just for the Needy, BUS. WK., Mar. 19, 2007, at
98 (criticizing that instead of providing full scholarships to the most financially needy
students, universities have started offering smaller scholarships to more students
from wealthy families as a way to increase university rankings and bring in students
who can pay a large portion of their own tuition).
37. It is possible that delivering financial aid using both expenditure programs
and tax benefits may represent a sensible overall program. David A. Weisbach &
Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 958
(2004). As Victor Thuronyi observed, it is sensible to ask whether “a tax provision . . .
can be replaced with a non-tax-based federal program that fulfills the current tax
provision’s purposes at least as effectively as does the current provision itself.” Victor
Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1186 (1988).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 25A (2000).
39. These credits are non-refundable.
Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-1(a) (2002).
Consequently, a taxpayer otherwise eligible for a tax credit under I.R.C. § 25A
receives no benefit to the extent that the credit exceeds the taxpayer’s tax liability.
40. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 17: YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX FOR
INDIVIDUALS 249 (2006) [hereinafter I.R.S. PUB. 17] (including tax tables for varied
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These tax credits are available to taxpayers whose incomes do not
exceed limits prescribed in the statute. Specifically, an unmarried
taxpayer is eligible for one of these tax credits only if the taxpayer’s
modified adjusted gross income is less than $55,000, and married
taxpayers are eligible for a tax credit only if their modified adjusted
41
gross income is less than $110,000. For unmarried taxpayers with
incomes between $45,000 and $55,000, the dollar amount of these
42
tax credits is phased-out. Consequently, unmarried taxpayers with
“modified adjusted gross income” of $47,000 would have their higher
43
educational tax credit reduced by twenty percent. Similarly, the tax
credits are phased-out for married taxpayers with incomes between
44
$90,000 and $110,000.
The higher education credits are allowed with respect to “qualified
tuition and related expenses” that are paid during any year to an
45
“eligible educational institution.” Section 25A(f) defines “qualified
tuition and related expenses” as the tuition and fees required for
46
courses of instruction. Although a college includes a student’s living
expenses, such as room and board, in computing the school’s cost of
attendance, these expenses are not “qualified tuition and related
47
expenses.” For purposes of these credits, the tuition and fees that
the educational institution charges are reduced by all tax-free
taxable income levels and filing status, and showing that as a taxpayer’s taxable
income increases, so does the taxpayer’s tax bracket); see also Michael Mumper, The
Future of College Access: The Declining Role of Public Higher Education in Promoting Equal
Opportunity, 585 ANNALS 97, 106 (2003) (explaining that the these credits do not
involve direct payment to students, but rather reduce the taxpayer’s taxable income,
and thus the amount of tax actually owed, with the assumption that the extra money
saved in taxes will be spent on education).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(d) (2000 & West Supp. 2006). The dollar limits in the text
reflect the effect of indexation of the dollar limits to reflect inflation. 26 U.S.C.
§ 25A(h)(2) (2000). Revenue Procedure 2005-47 contains the inflation adjusted
dollar limits applicable in 2006. Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979.
42. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(d) (2000 & West Supp. 2006). For the mathematical
formula that applies to calculate the phase-out of the credit, see I.R.S. PUB. 970, supra
note 17, at 14-15.
43. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(d)(2) (2000 & West Supp. 2006). § 25A(d)(3) defines
modified adjusted gross income as the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income increased by
the deductions allowed pursuant to §§ 911, 931 and 933.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(d)(2)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2006).
45. § 25A defines an “eligible educational institution” as an institution described
by the Higher Education Act, and generally includes all accredited institutions. In
addition, the program must be eligible to participate in a financial program under
Title IX of the Act. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(f)(2) (2000).
46. Id. § 25A(f)(1).
47. The term “qualified tuition and related expenses” does not include
nonacademic fees or education programs involving sports, games, or hobbies, unless
this course is part of the individual’s degree program. Id. § 25A(f)(1)(B)-(C); see
I.R.S. PUB. 970, supra note 17, at 12 (2006) (explaining that nonacademic fees
include amounts paid for insurance, medical expenses, room and board,
transportation or similar personal, living or family expenses).
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educational assistance (including qualified scholarships and
48
educational assistance paid under veterans’ programs).
Taxpayers face several choices in connection with these tax
49
credits. First, the taxpayer’s family must determine which family
member will receive the largest tax benefit as a result of claiming the
credit. A taxpayer may claim the credit for the tuition and fees paid
with respect to the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or the taxpayer’s
50
dependent. Expenses paid by a dependent student are treated as
51
being paid by the taxpayer claiming the credit. Either the parent or
dependent child, but not both, may claim the credit for a taxable
52
year.
Second, taxpayers must decide whether to claim the Hope
Scholarship credit or the Lifetime Learning credit with respect to a
student for a given year. As discussed below, the two credits are
53
computed differently.
A taxpayer may not claim both a Hope
Scholarship credit and a Lifetime Learning credit with respect to the
54
same student in the same tax year. Consequently, the taxpayer must
decide which tax credit yields the larger tax benefit.
Third, taxpayers must decide whether to claim an education tax
credit or a § 222 deduction for higher education expenses. A
taxpayer is prohibited from claiming both a credit and the deduction
55
for a particular student in the same year. Again, the taxpayer must
decide which tax provision yields the largest tax benefit. Empirical
evidence suggests that taxpayers frequently fail to make the optimal
56
choice.
48. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(g)(2) (2000). The interplay between the exclusions for such
tax-free items as scholarships and the education tax credits may produce unexpected
and complex interactions. See Coven, supra note 18, at 38 (realizing that in some
cases, benefits from tax credits may be greater than the benefit of excluding tax-free
aid from income, and thus a student may not maximize her potential government
assistance by having to choose one over the other).
49. Albert J. Davis uses tax benefits for higher education as the basis for a case
study in “choice complexity” that results from the proliferation of tax provisions.
Albert J. Davis, Choice Complexity in Tax Benefits for Higher Education, 55 NAT’L TAX J.
509, 509 (2002). He observes that “too many choices are overly burdensome. In
some circumstances, families don’t just make inferior choices, they may choose an
education benefit that makes them worse off than if they had chosen no benefit.” Id.
50. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(f)(1)(A) (2000).
51. Id. § 25A(g)(3).
52. I.R.S. Notice 97-60, 1997-2 C.B. 310, Q&A (7), (10).
53. See discussion infra Parts I.A.2-3.
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-1(b)(1) (2002).
55. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(g)(5) (2000).
56. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LIMITED RESEARCH EXISTS ON
EFFECTIVENESS OF TOOLS TO ASSIST STUDENTS AND FAMILIES THROUGH TITLE IV AND TAX
PREFERENCES 4 (2005), available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-684
[hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EFFECTIVENESS OF TOOLS] (noting
that twenty-one percent of those taxpayers who claimed the tuition deduction would
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In making these determinations, taxpayers must take into account
57
the fact that the higher education tax credits are not refundable.
2.

Hope Scholarship Credit
The Hope Scholarship credit is structured to produce the largest
tax benefit for taxpayers who pay relatively modest amounts of tuition
for two years following graduation from high school—in other words,
58
for students attending community college. For these students, the
Hope Scholarship credit may equal all, or a very large percentage, of
59
the tuition charges. This credit is available only for the first two years
60
of a student’s undergraduate education. The credit is available only
for students who are at least half-time students during one academic
61
period during the taxable year.
For 2006, the magnitude of the Hope Scholarship credit equals the
sum of: (1) 100% of the first $1,100 of tuition and related expenses
paid during the year, and (2) 50% of the next $1,100 paid during the
62
year.
Consequently, the maximum Hope Scholarship credit
63
available with respect to any student for 2006 was $1,650. A taxpayer
may claim the Hope Scholarship credit for each eligible student in
64
the taxpayer’s family.
3.

Lifetime Learning Credit
Unlike the Hope Scholarship tax credit, the Lifetime Learning
credit provides the greatest benefit with respect to students who
attend more expensive colleges and universities, and it is available for
all years of undergraduate and graduate education. Specifically, the

have reduced their tax liability if they had claimed the Lifetime Learning credit
instead).
57. See 26 U.S.C. § 26(a)(1)(A) (2000) (limiting the amount of tax credits
allowable to the taxpayer’s tax liability for the taxable year). The refundable tax
credits are those authorized in §§ 31-36. Id. §§ 31-36; see also id. § 6401(b) (classifying
refundable credits that exceed tax liability as an overpayment that will be refunded
to the taxpayer).
58. See Davis, supra note 49, at 516 (calculating that for the 2004 taxable year, the
Hope credit was most beneficial to middle-income taxpayers who incur education
costs up to $7,250); Coven, supra note 18, at 26 (stating that because the deduction
available under the Hope credit is small, it is most beneficial to students attending
two-year community colleges).
59. See TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICINGS, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that the average
charge for tuition and fees at a two-year public institution in 2005-06 was $2,182); see
also Coven, supra note 18, at 26 (recognizing that the Hope credit is a “high
percentage credit” applicable to a rather small amount of tuition and fees).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(b)(2) (2000).
61. Id. § 25A(b)(2)(B).
62. Id. § 25A(b)(1). The dollar limits specified in this provision are indexed to
reflect inflation beginning in 2002. Id. § 25A(h)(1).
63. Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979, 982.
64. I.R.S. Notice 97-60, 1997-2 C.B. 310.

PIKE.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

6/2/2007 3:59:39 PM

NO WEALTHY PARENT LEFT BEHIND

1239

Lifetime Learning credit equals 20% of the first $10,000 paid for
65
“qualified tuition and related expenses.” Assuming that a student
would be eligible for both credits, in 2006 the Lifetime Learning
credit produces a larger credit than the Hope Scholarship credit if
the “qualified tuition and related expenses” paid with respect to the
66
student exceed $8,250. Unlike the Hope Scholarship credit, the
Lifetime Learning credit is not limited to the student’s first two years
67
of post-secondary education.
The Lifetime Learning credit is available for costs attributable to
instruction taken for the purposes of acquiring or improving job
68
skills. Consequently, the instruction does not have to be part of a
69
degree program. Further, unlike the Hope Scholarship credit, the
Lifetime Learning credit does not require that the student carry a
70
course load of at least one-half the full-time course load. Therefore,
the Lifetime Learning credit is available to a student who enrolls for a
single course at an eligible institution that enhances the student’s job
71
skills.
Finally, unlike the Hope Scholarship credit, which is calculated on
a per-student basis, the Lifetime Learning credit is calculated on a
72
per-family basis. That is, the maximum credit that a taxpayer may
claim in any given year is $2,000, regardless of how many students are
73
in the taxpayer’s family.

65. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(c)(1) (2000). The $10,000 limitation on the “qualified
tuition and related expenses” taken into account for purposes of calculating the
Lifetime Learning credit is not indexed for inflation. See generally id. § 25A(h)
(indexing the amount of Hope Scholarship credits, but not providing for inflation
adjustments on the Lifetime Learning credit).
66. For a taxpayer who paid “qualified tuition and related expenses” of $8,250,
the Lifetime Learning credit would equal $1,650, which equals the maximum Hope
Scholarship credit for 2006. I.R.S. PUB. 970, supra note 17, at 18.
67. See 26 U.S.C. § 25A(c)(1) (2000) (omitting the two-year limitations as
imposed by 26 U.S.C. § 25A(b)(2)).
68. Id. § 25A(c)(2)(B).
69. See Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-4(c)(1) (2002) (providing that a course not part of a
postsecondary degree program is characterized as a qualified tuition and related
expense if it is taken to improve job skills).
70. See 26 U.S.C. § 25A(c) (2000) (omitting the half-time exclusion imposed by
the Hope Scholarship Credit under 26 U.S.C. § 25A(b)(2)(B)).
71. I.R.S. Notice 97-60, 1997-2 C.B. 310, Sec. 2, Q&A (4).
72. See 26 U.S.C. § 25A(c)(1) (2000) (omitting the language “any eligible
student” as referenced under the Hope Scholarship Credit section, 26 U.S.C.
§ 25A(b)(1), and tying the credit to 20% of $10,000); I.R.S. PUB. 970, supra note 17,
at 18.
73. 26 U.S.C. § 25A(c)(1) (2000).
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B. The “Above the Line” Deduction for Qualified Tuition
and Related Expenses
Section 222 establishes a tax deduction for higher education
expenses that serves as an alternative tax benefit to the education tax
credits. As discussed above, this provision provides that taxpayers
may claim a deduction for a limited portion of their higher education
74
expenses. Unlike most other deductions allowed with respect to
expenditures that are personal in nature, this deduction is treated as
75
an “above-the-line” deduction. Most taxpayers do not itemize their
76
deductions. Because § 222 creates an “above-the-line” deduction,
taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions may claim the
deduction for higher education expenses.
Similar to the education tax credits, § 222 contains both eligibility
requirements based on income and limitations on the magnitude of
the tax benefits. Unmarried taxpayers with incomes of up to $65,000
(and married taxpayers with incomes of up to $130,000) may deduct
77
up to $4,000 of “qualified tuition and related expenses.”
For
taxpayers whose incomes exceed these limits but do not exceed
$80,000 for unmarried taxpayers (or $160,000 for married taxpayers),
78
the deduction is limited to $2,000. As enacted, § 222 applied only
79
for taxable years 2002 to 2005. In 2006, Congress extended the
80
benefits of § 222 to taxable years 2006 and 2007.
As with the education tax credits, room and board are not treated
81
as “qualified tuition and related expenses.” Similarly, the tuition
and fees that the educational institution charges are reduced by all
74. 26 U.S.C. § 222 (Supp. IV 2004), amended by Tax Relief and Health Care Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922, 2933 (extending the sunset date
for this provision through December 31, 2007).
75. See id. § 62(a)(18) (directing that adjusted gross income shall be calculated
after § 222 deductions).
76. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-509, TAX DEDUCTIONS: FURTHER
ESTIMATES OF TAXPAYERS WHO MAY HAVE OVERPAID FEDERAL TAXES BY NOT ITEMIZING 1
(2002) (reporting that in recent years only thirty percent of Americans have itemized
deductions on their tax returns).
77. 26 U.S.C. § 222(a), (b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2004), amended by Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922, 2933.
78. Id. § 222(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2004), amended by Tax Relief and Health Care
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922, 2933. Section 25A and § 222
utilize slightly different income measures to determine eligibility for the benefits
under these provisions. See supra note 25 (comparing § 25A(d)(3)’s definition of
“modified adjusted gross income” with § 222(b)(2)(C)’s definition of “adjusted gross
income”).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 222(b)(2)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 2004), amended by Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922, 2933.
80. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat.
2922, 2933.
81. I.R.S. PUB. 970, supra note 17, at 12 (2006).
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tax-free educational assistance (including qualified scholarships and
82
educational assistance paid under veterans’ programs). A taxpayer
may not claim this deduction if the taxpayer claims an educational
83
tax credit with respect to the same student.
Unlike a tax credit, which directly offsets the amount of tax that a
taxpayer owes, a deduction offsets the amount of income that is
subject to tax. Consequently, the economic benefit that a taxpayer
enjoys from the § 222 deduction depends upon the taxpayer’s tax
bracket because the deduction offsets income that would have been
84
taxed at that rate. Thus, a taxpayer who deducts $4,000 as higher
education expenses and who has a marginal tax rate of 25% will
85
realize tax savings of $1,000.
C. Section 529 Qualified Tuition Programs
Section 529 provides significant tax benefits for taxpayers who
make investments in a “qualified tuition program.” As discussed
below, the investment income that these investments generate is
exempt from taxation to the extent that these amounts are used to
86
pay higher education expenses.
The popular media and the
financial press refer to plans satisfying the requirements of this
87
section as “529 plans.”
Section 529 plans have their origin as prepaid tuition
88
arrangements created under state law. Under these prepaid tuition
plans, parents (or grandparents) were able to prepay the tuition at a

82. See 26 U.S.C. § 222(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2004), amended by Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922, 2933 (noting
that qualified tuition and related expenses are to be reduced in accordance with 26
U.S.C. § 135(d)).
83. Id. § 222(c)(2)(A), amended by Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 2922, 2933 (2006).
84. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX TUTORIAL-TAX CREDIT FOR CHILD AND
DEPENDENT
CARE
EXPENSES,
TAX
DEDUCTION
V.
TAX
CREDIT,
http://www.irs.gov/app/understandingTaxes/jsp/hows/tt/module08/tax_mod8_2.
jsp (illustrating the effect of a deduction on a taxpayer’s income tax liability).
85. Under the tax rate schedule in effect in 2006, an unmarried individual with
taxable income between $30,650 and $74,200 faces a statutory marginal tax rate of
twenty-five percent. I.R.S. PUB. 17, supra note 40, at 262. To the extent that the
taxpayer is subject to income-based reductions in other tax benefits (or other nontax governmental benefits) that are based upon adjusted gross income, the tax
savings resulting from the “above-the-line” deduction for higher education expenses
may exceed the statutory marginal tax rate.
86. See discussion infra Part I.C.
87. John W. Schoen, College Saving 101: Sorting Through the Choices: From Taxable
Accounts to 529 Plans, Investment Options can Stymie Parents, MSNBC, July 31, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8716152.
88. Wayne M. Gazur, Abandoning Principles: Qualified Tuition Programs and Wealth
Transfer Taxation Doctrine, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 2 (2004).
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particular college or university when their child was young. In form,
these arrangements looked like an advance purchase of a service, i.e.,
90
college tuition. Because the purchaser was able to lock in the thencurrent tuition rates, the prepayment produced an economic return
to the extent that higher tuition rates were charged when the student
91
actually attended the college or university.
Prior to the enactment of § 529, the Internal Revenue Service
challenged the asserted tax benefits arising from an arrangement that
92
the State of Michigan had created. Specifically, it asserted that the
legal entity formed to receive the prepayments was a taxable
corporation, with the result that its income, including its investment
93
income, was subject to federal income tax. Ultimately, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected this challenge,
and held that the income of this legal entity was exempt from federal
94
income taxation.
Congress enacted § 529 in 1996 in part to codify the Sixth Circuit’s
holding with respect to the Michigan prepaid tuition plan. The
Senate Finance Committee Report stated that “[t]he Committee
believes that it is appropriate to clarify the tax treatment of Statesponsored prepaid tuition and educational savings programs in order
to encourage persons to save to meet post-secondary educational
95
expenses.”
89. See, e.g., Eric A. Lustig, Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax
Provisions—Middle Class Panacea or Placebo? Continuing Problems and Variations on a
Theme, 31 AKRON L. REV. 229, 240-43 (1997) (detailing that in 1997, various models
for state prepaid tuition existed, many based upon plans originating in Michigan,
Ohio and Massachusetts).
90. See id. at 240 (following the Michigan plan, beneficiaries could purchase
predetermined tuition benefits at an early age, thereby locking-in a tuition price
based upon a contract).
91. Id.
92. Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994).
93. Id. at 821. State law required Michigan to request a favorable ruling from the
Internal Revenue Service as to whether the advance payment tuition structure would
be considered income of the legal entity. Id. The Internal Revenue Service
responded to the State of Michigan, stating that while no income would be realized
by the purchaser when purchasing the prepaid tuition, the trust would be subject to
taxation on its investment income. Id.
94. Id. at 818.
95. S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 106 (1996). The Honorable Connie Morella,
commenting on prepaid tuition plans before Congress, stated:
Recently, I introduced a resolution regarding tuition prepayment plans by
States to allow families to save for their children’s college education at a
fixed rate. I am very pleased that this conference report includes an
amendment which would prohibit the Internal Revenue Service from taxing
State-sponsored prepaid college tuition plans until the funds are distributed.
These State-sponsored plans have allowed more than 500,000 American
families to save years in advance for their children’s college tuition. The
provision regarding prepaid tuition plans will make it possible for more
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As enacted, however, this provision went further: it created three
significant tax benefits if plan assets were used to pay higher
education expenses. First, it exempted qualifying State tuition
96
programs from taxation.
Consequently, the investment income
generated during the years in which funds were held and invested by
97
Second, the provision
the State tuition program was not taxed.
deferred the taxation of the investment income to the plan
beneficiary (or the account owner) until amounts were distributed
98
from the plan. Third, it taxed the plan beneficiary (typically, the
lower tax-bracket student) rather than the account owner (typically,
99
the student’s higher tax-bracket parent or grandparent).
In
addition, it provided these benefits to two forms of educational
savings: the prepaid tuition programs and the education savings
100
account structure.
Congress enhanced the tax benefits given to § 529 plan
101
investments in 2001.
Most significantly, the 2001 amendments to
§ 529 exempted from taxation any distribution from a § 529 plan
102
The 2001
used to pay “qualified higher education expenses.”
amendments were scheduled to sunset for taxable years beginning
103
after December 31, 2010.
However, Congress eliminated these
104
sunset provisions in the Pension Protection Act of 2006. Unlike the
other educational tax incentives, § 529 contains no explicit
105
limitations on the dollar amounts that may be invested. Nor does it
limit eligibility for participation to taxpayers whose incomes are less
106
than statutory dollar limits. And, contrary to the scope of the other
higher education tax incentives, § 529’s favorable tax treatment is not
limited to tuition and fees; the favorable tax treatment extends to
107
room and board as well.
States to adopt similar programs, affording more families the opportunity to
save for their children’s education.
142 CONG. REC. 15, 21361 (1996).
96. 26 U.S.C. § 529(a) (2000).
97. The exemption of the qualified state tuition program from taxation codified
the holding in Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994).
98. 26 U.S.C. § 529(c)(3)(A) (2000).
99. Id.; see Linda Levine, Saving for College Through Qualified Tuition (Section 529)
Programs, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., May 17, 2005, at 10.
100. Gazur, supra note 88, at 6.
101. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836,
107th Cong. § 402 (2001).
102. 26 U.S.C. § 529(c)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2004).
103. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836,
107th Cong. § 901 (2001).
104. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1304(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1109 (2006).
105. Id.
106. 26 U.S.C. § 529 (Supp. IV 2004).
107. Id. § 529(e)(3)(B)(i).
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Indeed, § 529 contains two provisions that encourage taxpayers to
make extremely large contributions to these plans. First, § 529
characterizes any contribution to a qualified tuition program as a
108
completed gift, which is not a future interest in property.
As a
result, a contribution to a § 529 plan is eligible for the annual gift tax
109
exclusion, which in 2006 and 2007 equals $12,000. Second, § 529
provides that a taxpayer may elect to treat a contribution to a 529
plan in excess of the annual gift tax exclusion as if it were made
110
ratably over a five year period.
Consequently, a parent (or
grandparent) could today contribute up to $60,000 in a lump sum to
a § 529 plan for each beneficiary, without the imposition of any
111
federal gift tax. If two parents (or grandparents) take advantage of
this provision, the maximum gift tax-free lump sum contribution to
the plan would equal $120,000. As a result, § 529 anticipates the
potential accumulation of several hundred thousand dollars per
112
beneficiary.
II. TAX POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE TAX PROVISIONS
The tax provisions discussed above are properly viewed as a federal
113
They
expenditure program implemented through the tax system.
are designed as programs to help American families pay the everincreasing costs of higher education. There is little argument that
114
these provisions represent structural provisions of an income tax.
108. 26 U.S.C. § 529(c)(2)(A)(i) (2000). Because the contribution is made to the
plan to pay future higher educational expenses rather than a payment to a college or
university for current tuition, the contribution will not qualify as a “qualified
transfer” for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 2503(e). Id. § 529(c)(2)(A)(ii). Consequently,
the contribution is treated as a taxable gift to the beneficiary except to the extent
that the annual gift tax exclusion applies. See generally Gazur, supra note 88, at 15
(discussing the transfer tax treatment of contributions to a § 529 plan).
109. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2000).
110. Id. § 529(c)(2)(B).
111. Id.
112. See Gazur, supra note 88, at 25 (identifying state plans that permit the
accumulation of up to $315,270 per beneficiary).
113. For the classic analysis of governmental expenditures implemented through
the tax system, see Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV.
705 (1970).
114. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (1967) (characterizing educational
expenses as “personal expenditures or constitute an inseparable aggregate of
personal and capital expenditures” and declaring that these expenditures are,
presumptively, not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenditures).
Some have argued that the appropriate tax base should be consumption rather than
income. Under a consumption tax, income invested during a year would not be
taxed currently, but instead, taxation would occur when consumption took place.
The tax treatment of investment income under § 529 is consistent with consumption
tax treatment.
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Consequently, it is appropriate to evaluate these provisions in the
same manner as one would evaluate a traditional expenditure
program that provides grants to students who attend higher
education institutions. When evaluated on this basis, these tax
provisions have serious shortcomings.
At the outset, it is important to note that these tax provisions
constitute an increasingly large portion of the federal financial aid
effort. In fiscal year 2007, the federal Pell Grants totaled nearly $13
115
billion, with an average grant of less than $2,500. According to the
list of tax expenditures reported in connection with the 2008 budget,
the tax provisions discussed above result in revenue losses of $7.8
116
billion in fiscal year 2007. Specifically:
•

•

•

•

The Hope Scholarship credit reduced tax collections in
fiscal year 2007 by $3.33 billion. During fiscal years 2008 to
2012, it is estimated this credit will reduce income tax
collections by almost $20 billion.
The Lifetime Learning credit reduced tax collection by
$2.19 billion in 2007, and will reduce income tax
collections by an estimated $12.7 billion during fiscal years
2008 to 2012.
The tax preferences arising in connection with § 529 plans
reduced tax collection by $830 million in fiscal year 2007.
The revenue losses arising in connection with these plans
will increase at an extremely rapid rate in subsequent
years, and will reduce income tax collections by an
estimated $7.5 billion during fiscal years 2008 to 2012, with
the annual revenue loss doubling over this five-year
117
period.
The “above-the-line” deduction for higher education
expenses reduced tax collections in fiscal year 2007 by
118
$1.45 billion.

115. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2008 330-31 (2007).
116. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2008 288
(2007) [hereinafter 2008 BUDGET PERSPECTIVE].
117. Prior to the elimination of the sunset provisions applicable to § 529 plans in
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the estimated revenue losses arising in
connection with these plans for the fiscal years 2007-2011 were estimated to total
$4.16 billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2007 288 (2006).
118. 2008 BUDGET PERSPECTIVE, supra note 116, at 288. The tax expenditures
revenue estimates were based upon the law in effect on December 31, 2006. Id. at
285. Because the deduction authorized in § 222 is scheduled to sunset after 2007,
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It is appropriate to ask whether these expenditures represent a
sensible supplement to the federal government’s direct spending
programs.
A. Analysis of the Education Tax Credits and the “Above-the-Line”
Deduction for Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses
In several respects, the education tax credits contained in § 25A
and the “above-the-line” deduction for qualified tuition and related
expenses contained in § 222 are seriously flawed tools for delivering
financial aid for higher education.
The first set of concerns relates to the general administration of
federal financial aid programs. Apart from the tax provisions, the
process for obtaining financial aid is well understood by potential
college students and their parents. When applying for financial aid
for college, students submit the dreaded Free Application for Federal
119
Student Aid (“FAFSA”) form.
Colleges and universities use the
information reported in this form to determine eligibility for a broad
range of federal financial aid programs, including Pell Grants, federal
subsidized loans, unsubsidized loans, PLUS loans and federal work120
study funds.
In addition, colleges and universities use this
information to determine whether to award grants and loans from
121
their own financial aid resources.
Further, the creation of federal
grants in the Internal Revenue Code requires that students and
parents learn about the tax provisions that create a separate source of
financial aid. These students and parents must also figure out how to
comply with the specific requirements of these tax provisions.
Delivering financial aid through the tax system also creates a
serious cash flow problem. Students generally must pay their tuition
bills at the start of an academic semester. A Pell Grant that a student
122
receives is reflected in the student’s tuition bill. Thus, the student
does not need to obtain financing for the portion of the tuition bill
that the Pell Grant satisfies. In contrast, taxpayers will receive the
economic benefits from the education tax credits (and the deduction
the tax expenditure tables do not contain a five-year estimate of revenue losses
attributable to this provision.
119. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2007-2008 FAFSA on the Web Worksheet, at 1,
http://www.fafsa.ed.gov/fafsaws78c.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
120. King, supra note 3, at 5-6.
121. Id. at 6.
122. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Student Guide 2005-2006, Types of Federal Student
Aid, http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/publications/student_guide/2005-2006/eng
lish/types.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (providing that the schools can apply the
funds to existing student accounts or can send a check directly to the student).
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for higher education expenses) only after they file their tax returns.
The tax benefits that a taxpayer claims are based upon tuition paid in
the prior taxable year. Consequently, the taxpayer may have a cash
flow problem in connection with the payment of the portion of her
tuition bill that ultimately will be satisfied by the tax credit (or the tax
benefit attributable to the deduction under § 222).
In addition, the statutory language establishing eligibility for, and
the magnitude of, the credits is complicated and confusing. As one
scholar has noted, “the drafting of the dollar ceiling on the Hope
124
Scholarship credit is an extraordinary exercise in gobbledygook.”
The complex statutory requirements require that taxpayers identify,
and comply with, a set of rules separate from the traditional financial
aid applications.
Admittedly, the Pell Grant program and the other federal
programs also contain complex and technical requirements.
125
Colleges and universities, however, implement these programs.
Consequently, a comparatively small number of entities must master
the technical requirements of these programs. Compliance with the
tax credits, in comparison, is decentralized to a much larger number
of individual taxpayers, each of whom receives a relatively modest
benefit. As discussed above, choosing the optimal tax provision
126
requires analysis of difficult and confusing choices.
Delivering a federal subsidy through the tax system also raises
compliance concerns that do not exist in programs such as the Pell
Grant program. Colleges and universities administer the Pell Grant
program, and they make certain that the Pell Grant awarded does not
127
They also identify which
exceed prescribed statutory limits.
students are eligible for the Pell Grants; students cannot self-certify

123. Although it is possible that sophisticated taxpayers could adjust their income
tax withholding to take into account the anticipated tax benefits that will result from
claiming the education tax credit and the deduction for higher education expenses,
it is unlikely that most taxpayers will do so.
124. Coven, supra note 18, at 35.
125. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a(i) (2000) (defining the character of the agreements
made between institutions of higher education and the Secretary regarding the
disbursement of Pell Grants to eligible students).
126. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (illustrating how students have
access to federal grants and loans while their families are eligible for educationrelated tax breaks, but noting that the effectiveness of these programs is unclear due
to the programs’ complexities). Many taxpayers will seek expert advice to assist them
in this process. In many instances this will result in a financial burden for these
taxpayers.
127. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1070a(b) (2000) (outlining the purpose and amount of Pell
Grants to be given to eligible students).
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128

their eligibility for grants under that program.
In comparison,
taxpayers determine their own eligibility for the education tax credits
and the deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses. Many
taxpayers may be unaware of their eligibility for these provisions, with
the result that they will not claim available credits or deductions. The
Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) estimated that twenty-seven
percent of taxpayers eligible for either the education tax credit or the
education tax deduction failed to take advantage of these
129
provisions.
In addition, taxpayers may claim tax benefits in excess of those
allowed under the statute. Frequently, the Internal Revenue Service
cannot determine the amount of qualified tuition and related
130
expenses paid during a given year. Moreover, eligibility to claim a
child as a dependent affects eligibility for the credits, and this
determination turns on factual questions. Given the relatively small
tax benefits that any individual taxpayer may claim, it is unlikely that
the Internal Revenue Service will audit taxpayers to determine the
correctness of the claimed tax benefits.
The second and more serious set of concerns relates to the
distributional effects of the education tax credits. Empirical data
suggests that middle-income and upper-middle-income taxpayers
131
enjoy most of the benefits from the education tax credits.
The
problems arise primarily from the fact that the education tax credits
132
Consequently, the structure of the education
are not refundable.
128. See id. § 1070a(f) (delegating the responsibility of calculating students’
eligibility for the Pell Grant to the institutions of higher education acting as
contractors).
129. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EFFECTIVENESS OF TOOLS, supra note 56, at
3-4.
130. See
Instructions
for
Forms
1098-E
and
1098-T
(2007),
http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1098et/ar02.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007)
(requiring colleges and universities to file information returns that identify certain
students who enroll at the institution). Although these institutions may report
payments received, or amounts billed, for qualified tuition and related expenses,
they are not required to do so. Id. In addition, they are not obligated to report
amounts that a student pays for attendance that is not part of a degree or certificate
program, even though these expenditures may give rise to eligibility for the Lifetime
Learning credit. Id.; see Frequently Asked Tax Questions and Answers: Lifetime
Learning Credit, http://www.irs.gov/faqs/faq-kw104.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007)
(explaining that students may be qualify for a Lifetime Learning Credit if they are
enrolled in one or more courses at an eligible educational institution).
131. Pamela J. Jackson, An Overview of Tax Benefits for Higher Education Expenses,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Jan. 17, 2006, at 21, available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/
RL32554_20060117.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
132. See Lily Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 49, 54 (2006)
(“Refundable tax credits are the only straightforward way to provide a uniform
subsidy for behavior generating positive externalities through the individual income
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tax credits denies any benefit to the students with the greatest
financial need. As Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag have observed,
each year more than one-third of households have no federal income
tax liability and almost one-half of all children live in households with
133
no tax liability.
For example, all unmarried individuals who are not a dependent of
any other taxpayer with income of up to $8,450 have no federal
134
income tax liability.
These taxpayers enjoy no benefit from the
education tax credits. Similarly, a family of four that files a joint
return in 2006 and that has income of less than $23,600 also receives
no benefit from the education tax credit. For many other middleincome taxpayers, the non-refundable nature of the education tax
credits limits the tax benefit available from the credit: their pre135
credit tax liability is too small.
In contrast, taxpayers with greater
amounts of income enjoy the full tax credit.
These provisions particularly disadvantage undergraduate students
who are classified as independent of their parents. The Pell Grant
program characterizes students as independent only if they are:
(1) at least twenty-four years of age, (2) married, or (3) have
136
dependents of their own.
This group of students includes single
parents and those who are returning to school after some years in the
work force. These independent students constitute more than fifty
137
percent of the Pell Grant recipients.
Most of the concerns discussed above in connection with the
education tax credits apply with equal, if not greater, force to the
deduction for higher education expenses. For example, students and
their families must identify the existence of the federal tax deduction,
and determine which tax benefit produces the largest tax benefit. As
with the credits, taxpayers receive the tax savings arising from
deducting higher education expenses long after they must pay the
tuition bills. The distributional effects of the deduction for higher
education expenses, however, raise one additional concern.

tax . . . . The limits of non-refundable tax incentives can be seen in an array of
current programs.”).
133. Id. at 54.
134. See I.R.S. PUB. 17, supra note 40, at 25, 132 (clarifying that a taxpayer is
eligible for a standard deduction of $5,150 and a personal exemption of $3,300).
135. See TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING, supra note 2, at 10 (reporting that, in 200405, the average tax saving from the education tax credits and deduction was only
$644).
136. See KING, supra note 3, at 11 (explaining that a student cannot obtain
independent status for purposes of the Pell Grant program as a result of the parents’
failure to claim their child as a dependent for federal income tax purposes).
137. Id. at 13.
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Typically, the decision to use tax deductions to deliver economic
subsidies raises two distinct distributional issues. First, most of these
deductions are allowed only if taxpayers itemize their deductions.
These deductions provide no economic benefit to the two-thirds of
taxpayers who claim the standard deduction rather than itemizing
138
The deduction for higher education expenses,
their deductions.
139
however, is an “above-the-line” deduction.
As a result, both
itemizers and non-itemizers may claim this deduction. Consequently,
§ 222 is not subject to this first criticism.
Second, the tax savings that result from claiming the deduction for
higher education expenses depend upon a taxpayer’s marginal tax
rate. For a taxpayer in the fifteen percent tax bracket, the maximum
140
§ 222 deduction ($4,000) results in a tax savings of $600.
For a
taxpayer in the twenty-eight percent tax bracket, the corresponding
141
The “upside-down” pattern of benefits, with
tax savings is $1,120.
higher-income taxpayers receiving a larger economic benefit than
lower-income taxpayers, is problematical. Unless the tuition subsidy
for these higher-income taxpayers yields a larger societal benefit than
a comparable subsidy for lower-income taxpayers, this distribution of
142
tax benefits cannot be justified.
In conclusion, the non-refundable nature of the education tax
credits skews the tax benefits in a regressive manner: the working
poor receive no benefit; the lower-middle class receive modest
143
benefits; and the upper-middle class receive the largest benefit.
Similarly, the deduction for higher education expenses yields a
regressive pattern of benefits. It yields no benefit unless the taxpayer
would have had a positive tax liability prior to claiming this

138. Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 132, at 53.
139. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (citing statutes that make tax
benefits accessible to those who may not qualify for a Hope Scholarship credit or a
Lifetime Learning credit).
140. 26 U.S.C. § 222(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2004).
141. Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code contains explicit marginal tax rates
in excess of twenty-eight percent. In 2006, these rates apply to married taxpayers
filing a joint return with taxable incomes in excess of $188,450 and to unmarried
taxpayers with taxable incomes of $154,800. Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-47 I.R.B. 979.
Taxpayers subject to these higher marginal tax rates have incomes that disqualify
them from claiming the deduction for higher education expenses. It is possible that,
after taking into account the effect of the § 222 deduction on the income-based
phase-out of other tax benefits, the overall marginal effect of the deduction will
exceed the amounts stated in the text.
142. Batchelder, Goldberg & Orszag, supra note 132, at 47.
143. See discussion supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text (arguing that the
structure of the credit system, which denies benefits to students with the greatest
financial need, defeats the purpose of a distributional tax credit).
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144

deduction.
And, for taxpayers with positive tax liabilities, the
greatest benefits accrue to those subject to higher marginal tax
145
rates. These results violate the tax policy goal of achieving vertical
equity and cannot be justified as achieving a rational social policy
146
goal.
B. Analysis of § 529
The tax credits and the deduction for higher education expenses
provide tax benefits when taxpayers pay college tuition and fees. In
comparison, § 529 provides tax benefits for taxpayers who set aside
savings to pay for future higher education costs. This savings
incentive creates many of the problems discussed above. In addition,
the structural provisions of § 529 create distributional concerns that
are much more serious.
Perhaps the most serious criticism of § 529 is that it provides a tax
windfall without achieving any societal benefit. Section 529 does not
identify those who save additional amounts to pay higher educational
expenses; it simply rewards those who deposit funds into accounts
that satisfy the requirements of § 529. Many have analyzed tax
provisions that exempt from taxation certain investment vehicles.
For example, the GAO and Jane Gravelle of the Congressional
Research Service have analyzed research relating to tax-preferred
147
savings vehicles.
While acknowledging that different researchers
reached different conclusions, the GAO observed that “recent
research examining the universal IRA experience estimated that at
148
most 9 cents of each dollar contributed represented new saving.”
Gravelle also questioned whether tax-preferred savings vehicles
144. See discussion supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text (demonstrating
how those who do not earn enough to possess a positive tax liability cannot benefit
from the very educational tax benefits which could push them to a higher income
level)
145. See discussion supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text (illustrating how
individuals with higher marginal tax rates would accordingly possess a higher
household income while also benefiting from larger educational tax benefits
intended for less wealthy people who cannot afford education at all).
146. See Cynthia E. Garabedian, Tax Breaks for Higher Education: Tax Policy or Tax
Pandering?, 18 VA. TAX REV. 217, 234 (1998) (“[L]ow-income families may not enjoy
many of the benefits, while higher-income families may be able to take advantage of
loopholes even where they are strictly above the income limitations.”).
147. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT
NEED
TO
BE
REEXAMINED
51-52
(2005),
available
at
AND
http://unclefed.com/GAOReports/gao05-690.pdf
[hereinafter
GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY]; Jane G. Gravelle, Proposed Savings Accounts:
Economic and Budgetary Effects, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP., June 30, 2006, available at
http://www.annuity-insurers.org/pdfs/CRS-Report-on-LSAs-RSAs.pdf.
148. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 147, at 50-51.
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generate a substantial amount of savings that would not have taken
149
place in the absence of the preferential tax treatment. Section 529
promotes no societal goal to the extent that taxpayers simply shift
150
existing savings into § 529 plans. It merely creates a tax windfall.
Another concern is that § 529 benefits high-income and wealthy
taxpayers to a disproportionate extent.
This disproportionate
distribution of benefits results from several distinct factors. First,
higher income individuals are more likely to participate in a § 529
plan because they have more disposable income (or existing savings)
available for investing in the plans. They also tend to be more
financially sophisticated investors; they can either master the
complexities of § 529 plans, or obtain guidance from a financial
151
advisor to navigate the § 529 terrain.
Second, wealthier taxpayers have the capacity to make larger
contributions to a § 529 plan when a child is very young. The longer
the period that money is invested in a § 529 plan, the greater the tax
152
savings. Third, high-income taxpayers enjoy a larger tax benefit for
153
each dollar of investment income generated in the § 529 plan. For
example, a 35% tax-bracket taxpayer would owe 35 cents of tax on
each dollar of interest income earned in a taxable account. This
taxpayer avoids this tax when the interest income is earned in a § 529
plan. A 15% tax-bracket taxpayer would enjoy a tax savings less than
154
half as great.
To illustrate the relative tax savings of different investors in § 529
plans, consider the examples illustrated in the two tables contained in
the Appendix. Table 1 examines a situation in which two parents (or
grandparents) each contribute $60,000 to a § 529 plan in 2007 when
155
a child (or grandchild) is born.
If this one-time investment of
$120,000 earns a 6% return, the balance in the plan will grow to
149. See Gravelle, supra note 147, at 10-12 (weighing all sides of the debate around
the distributional effects of individual retirement accounts on savings).
150. Penelope Wang, The Trouble with 529 Plans: More and More, States are Messing
Up a Good Thing with Fees, Commissions, and Bum Funds, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 7, 2003,
http://money.cnn.com/2003/10/07/pf/college/529_0310/.
151. See id. (“Most folks simply lack the time and expertise to sort through those
choices.”).
152. See discussion infra Part II.B (comparing Appendix Tables 1 and 2).
153. See Jackson, supra note 131, at 19-20 (explaining the reasons behind these
advantages and projecting that they may stimulate greater participation of higher
income taxpayers than lower-income taxpayers in such savings programs).
154. To the extent that the § 529 plan investments generate returns taxed at lower
tax rates (such as capital gains or qualified dividends), the differential tax savings of
taxpayers in different tax brackets are reduced or eliminated.
155. The $60,000 contribution is the amount that a taxpayer may transfer to a
§ 529 plan for one beneficiary without creating a taxable gift for purposes of the gift
tax. 26 U.S.C. § 529(c)(2)(B).
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$363,072 in 2025, when the child is ready to enter college. Assuming
that the contributors were 35% tax-bracket taxpayers during all
relevant years, the same investment in a taxable savings vehicle would
have grown to only $248,243. In other words, the tax savings
resulting from investing in the § 529 plan generated an additional
$114,829 for these high-income taxpayers. In comparison, the tax
savings attributable to the § 529 plan would generate only an
156
additional $54,304 for the 15% tax-bracket contributors. Thus, the
benefit to the high-income taxpayer in this example is more than
double the benefit to the lower income taxpayer, even if one ignores
the greater ability of high-income taxpayers to make contributions to
a § 529 plan.
Table 2 in the Appendix examines a similar situation with one
significant difference:
instead of the one-time investment of
$120,000, the parents (or grandparents) make 19 annual
contributions (or a total of $190,000) to the § 529 plan beginning in
2007 when the child (or grandchild) is born. Again, the plan
investments earn a 6% return. When the child is ready to enter
college in 2025, the balance in the plan will total grow to $357,856. If
the contributors would have been taxed at a 35% rate during the
intervening years, the same investment in a taxable savings vehicle
would have grown to only $284,710. Here, the tax savings resulting
from investing in the § 529 plan generated an additional $73,146 for
these high-income taxpayers.
In comparison, the tax savings
attributable to the § 529 plan generated only $34,680 for the 15% taxbracket contributors. Again, the benefit to the high-income taxpayer
is more than double the benefit to the lower-income taxpayer.
These two examples demonstrate the significance of the timing of
contributions to a § 529 plan. In both examples, the investments
accumulated to approximately $360,000 in 2025 despite the fact that
the contributors in Table 2 contributed an additional $70,000 to the
plan. The ability of the contributors in Table 1 to front-load the
contributions produced significantly greater benefits. For the 35%
tax-bracket taxpayers who were able to make the one-time
contribution of $120,000, the tax savings resulting from investing in
the § 529 plan generated an additional $114,829. In comparison, the
tax savings attributable to the § 529 plan generated only $73,146 for
the 35% tax-bracket contributors who contributed $10,000 to the
plan each year. Thus, the greatest benefit goes to the wealthiest
156. This example makes an unrealistic assumption that two taxpayers in the
fifteen percent tax bracket could afford to make a one-time investment of $120,000.
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taxpayers who can afford to shift large sums into a § 529 plan when a
child is born.
Significantly, these examples are comparing the “haves” and the
“haves-even-more.” It is extraordinarily unlikely that many lower- and
middle-income families can afford to contribute $10,000 per year to a
§ 529 plan.
In conclusion, the benefits that arise in connection with § 529
plans are available only to those who can afford to save. The greatest
benefits accrue to those who can afford to front-load their
157
contributions and to those in the highest tax brackets. All of these
factors skew the rewards arising in connection with § 529 plans to
favor the high-income and wealthy taxpayers. And as the examples
demonstrate, the magnitude of the benefits arising from a § 529 plan
may greatly exceed the maximum benefits that might arise in
connection with the education tax credits and the deduction for
158
higher education expenses analyzed above.
Apart from these distributional concerns, the current rules
governing § 529 plans create opportunities for unintended estate and
gift tax avoidance. Wayne Gazur has pointed out that the transfer tax
provisions contained in § 529 conflict with generally applicable estate
159
and gift tax principles. The Wall Street Journal reports that estate
planners now take advantage of these inconsistencies to use § 529 as
160
the centerpiece of a highly flexible estate planning tool.
When
using these plans, wealthy individuals (such as grandparents) may
transfer large sums, and accumulate investment income, for the
benefit of their grandchildren while retaining two significant
161
powers.
First, they will retain the power to decide which of the
beneficiaries will receive the plan assets to pay for higher education,
162
or for any other purpose. Second, they may retain effective power
to revest the plan to themselves, albeit with income tax consequences,
without causing the plan assets to be included in their estate for
163
estate tax purposes. Use of § 529 to achieve these estate planning

157. See discussion supra Part II.B (describing the results of the scenarios based on
Appendix Tables 1 and 2).
158. Supra Part II.A.
159. Gazur, supra note 88, at 4.
160. See Ron Lieber, Green Thumb: A New Trick For Avoiding Estate Taxes, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 24, 2007, at B1 (revealing that 529 accounts allow the account owners to
“move huge piles of money out of their estates without paying taxes” while still
retaining control over the money).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; Gazur, supra note 88, at 44-45.
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goals is an unintended consequence of overly broad statutory
language.
In addition to the tax policy concerns discussed above, critics have
identified flaws in the administration of § 529 plans. Many programs
impose sizeable fees, which make the savings plans far less effective as
164
investment vehicles. In some cases, critics claim that the economic
165
burden of these fees completely offsets the tax benefits. Critics also
complain that the fee structures vary extensively from state to state,
166
To the extent
resulting in significant inequities among investors.
that § 529 plans charge excessive fees, the plans serve to enrich the
states and the financial institutions that administer the plans, rather
than the American families seeking to save to pay college tuition and
related expenses.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Internal Revenue Code contains several provisions designed to
help American families pay for the cost of higher education. The
Hope Scholarship tax credit, the Lifetime Learning credit and the
deduction for higher education expenses constitute federal
expenditure programs that are implemented in the Internal Revenue
Code. Unfortunately, these provisions are seriously flawed. First,
students and parents must learn about these tax provisions and their
requirements. Second, the tax provisions create a cash flow problem:
taxpayers must pay tuition many months before the tax benefits are
received. Third, and most significantly, the distributional effects of
the education tax credits and the deduction for higher education
expenses raise serious fairness issues: empirical data suggest that
middle-income and upper-middle-income taxpayers enjoy most of the

164. See Austan Goolsbee, The “529” Rip-Off: Those New College Savings Plans Aren’t
So Great, SLATE, Aug. 23, 2002, http://www.slate.com/id/2070062 (accusing
Arizona’s InvestEd plan of being “one of the most egregious examples,” but
explaining that Arizona is only one of twenty-seven states with excessively high fees).
165. Gazur, supra note 88, at 5 n.16; see Wang, supra note 150 (“The average 529
plan generates $1 million in state fees for every billion dollars invested . . . . Add
them all up, and the fees on some 529s can easily wipe out the benefit of the savings
plan’s tax deferral.”); see also John F. Wasik, College Funding is Subject to Unfair Rules,
Expensive Fees, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 28, 2004, at F7 (arguing that “sophisticated
financial planning” will be required for individuals to obtain funding for college
until the “playing field” of college-funding options is made more easily accessible).
166. Goolsbee, supra note 164. But see Anne Marie Chaker, 529 Plans Lose Their
Luster, WALL ST. J. COLL. J., Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.collegejournal.com/
aidadmissions/financialissues/20060306-chaker.html (providing examples of
changes being made in some states, such as Missouri and Wisconsin, to “burnish the
appeal of 529s and simplify the process,” including “broadening the investment
options available and negotiating lower fees”).
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benefits from the education tax credits. Low-income families receive
little, if any, benefit.
Section 529 provides tax benefits for taxpayers who set aside
savings to pay for future higher education costs. For many plan
participants, § 529 provides a tax windfall because it rewards
taxpayers who simply shift existing or expected savings into a taxpreferred form of savings. This provision also benefits high-income
and wealthy taxpayers to a disproportionate extent. Moreover, the
magnitude of these tax benefits may greatly exceed the tax savings
from the education tax credits or the deduction for higher education
expenses. These shortcomings represent unacceptable flaws in a taxbased federal expenditure program.
These tax provisions do not represent the only federal higher
education financial aid programs. They are just a part, albeit a very
large part, of the overall federal effort. The tax-based programs have
grown most rapidly in the last few years. Over the same period, the
maximum Pell Grant award has lost purchasing power in terms of
overall college costs. It is unwise education policy to lessen support
to those families with the greatest financial need while providing
much greater levels of support to those with greater financial
resources.
In light of these conclusions, Congress should enact legislative
changes. One possible alternative would be to repeal these tax
provisions and replace them with an enhanced expenditure program
that will provide assistance to American families who must pay college
costs for their children. These legislative changes would consolidate
the separate sources of federal financial aid grants in one program.
Fortunately, such a program already exists: the Pell Grant program.
Proceeding in this manner would create a single procedure for
parents and students seeking federal aid. From the students’ and
parents’ perspective, this procedure would simply involve filing the
FAFSA form, the one step that they already perform.
Revenue losses totaling $7.8 billion are attributable to the
educational tax credits, the deduction for higher education plans and
167
§ 529 plans in fiscal year 2007. If this amount were allocated to an
expansion of the Pell Grant program, aggregate grants could increase
from the current level of $13 billion to almost $21 billion without any
net effect on the federal budget. The expanded Pell Grant program
could provide benefits to students from a broader range of families,
167. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text (discussing the tax revenues
lost from reduced tax collections stemming from the Hope Scholarship credit,
Lifetime Learning credit, and tax preferences in connection with § 529 plans).
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so that many of the middle-income families who benefit from the
existing tax provisions would receive a Pell Grant. This change would
also reverse the practice of the past fifteen years of shifting resources
from the Pell Grant program, and other federal expenditure
programs, toward tax-based programs that are less efficient and
equitable.
Unfortunately, there are legislative obstacles to enacting these
changes. Different Congressional committees have authority over tax
168
legislation and non-tax federal expenditure programs. It is difficult
to enact legislation when different committees must operate in a
coordinated fashion. This is particularly true when the tax-writing
committees would need to abandon tax provisions that appeal to the
individual members of the Committee.
If these programs will remain in the Internal Revenue Code,
several legislative changes to these tax provisions would enhance
their distributional fairness.
First, Congress should make the Hope Scholarship credit and the
Lifetime Learning credit refundable.
Second, the separate deduction for higher education expenses
should terminate at the end of 2007, its currently scheduled sunset
date. If Congress were to decide that higher-income taxpayers should
receive financial assistance, Congress could modify the provisions of
the Lifetime Learning credits. For example, taxpayers with incomes
in excess of the current income limits could be allowed a credit less
than the current maximum credit of $2,000.
Third, Congress should enact limits on the benefits available from
participating in § 529 plans. One possibility would involve two steps.
First, income from a § 529 plan would be included in income for
federal income tax purposes. Second, a refundable tax credit would
169
be allowed to lessen the burden of taxation.
For example, the
credit could equal 20% of the investment income attributable to the
168. See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168,
1188 (1993) (explaining that the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee are “charged principally with matters of tax and finance,”
whereas the appropriations and budget committees “impose overall spending limits
in general areas”).
169. See Len Burman, Jason Furman, Greg Leiserson & Roberton Williams, An
Evaluation of the President’s Health Insurance Proposal, TAX NOTES, Mar. 12, 2007, at
1013 (discussing and analyzing a proposal put forth by President Bush with a similar
approach to modifying the existing tax treatment of health insurance). Under this
proposal, an employee would include in income her employer’s contribution to the
cost of the employee’s health insurance cost. Id. A separate standard deduction for
health insurance premiums would offset the tax burden resulting from this income
inclusion. Id.
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§ 529 plan. As with the Hope Scholarship and Lifetime Learning
credits, the proposed credit would be limited to a specified dollar
amount. This suggested tax credit would apply equally to taxpayers,
irrespective of their income level.
In addition, the limits
incorporated in the credit would assure that the existing disparities in
the benefits arising from § 529 plans would be mitigated.

PIKE.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

6/2/2007 3:59:39 PM

NO WEALTHY PARENT LEFT BEHIND

1259

APPENDIX
Table 1
Assumptions: One-time Contribution of $120,000; 6% interest rate
Year

Amounted
Contributed

2007
2008

120,000
0

Account
Balance
529 Plan
127,200
134,832

2009
0
142,922
2010
0
151,497
2011
0
160,587
2012
0
170,222
2013
0
180,436
2014
0
191,262
2015
0
202,737
2016
0
214,902
2017
0
227,796
2018
0
241,464
2019
0
255,951
2020
0
271,308
2021
0
287,587
2022
0
304,842
2023
0
323,133
2024
0
342,521
2025
0
363,072
Additional Accumulation in
Section 529 Plan

Account Balance
Account Balance
Taxable Investment Taxable Investment
35% Tax Bracket
15% Tax Bracket
124,680
126,120
129,543
132,552
134,595
139,844
145,298
150,964
156,852
162,969
169,325
175,929
182,790
189,919
197,326
205,021
213,017
221,325
229,956
238,925
248,243
114,829

139,312
146,417
153,884
161,733
169,981
178,650
187,761
197,337
207,401
217,979
229,095
240,779
253,059
265,965
279,529
293,785
308,768
54,304
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Table 2
Assumptions: $10,000 Annual Contributions; 6% interest rate
Year

Amount
Contributed

2007
2008

10,000
10,000

Account
Balance
529 Plan
10,600
21,836

2009
10,000
33,746
2010
10,000
46,371
2011
10,000
59,753
2012
10,000
73,938
2013
10,000
88,975
2014
10,000
104,913
2015
10,000
121,808
2016
10,000
139,716
2017
10,000
158,699
2018
10,000
178,821
2019
10,000
200,151
2020
10,000
222,760
2021
10,000
246,725
2022
10,000
272,129
2023
10,000
299,057
2024
10,000
327,600
2025
10,000
357,856
Additional Accumulation in
Section 529 Plan

Account Balance
Account Balance
Taxable Investment Taxable Investment
35% Tax Bracket
15% tax Bracket
10,390
10,510
21,185
21,556
32,401
44,055
56,163
68,744
81,815
95,395
109,506
124,167
139,399
155,226
171,669
188,754
206,506
224,950
244,113
264,023
284,710
73,146

33,165
45,367
58,191
71,668
85,833
100,721
116,368
132,812
150,096
168,261
187,352
207,417
228,505
250,669
273,963
298,445
324,176
33,680

